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Computer Technology Trade Secrets:
Protection in an International Setting
by VICTOR ROWLEY
This note supposes that a Japanese computer manufacturer has
induced the former employee of a California computer electronics
firm to reveal trade secrets belonging to the California firm. It fur-
ther supposes that in passing the information, the employee violates
a postemployment nondisclosure agreement that applies to trade
secrets. This hypothetical case is set in California because many
computer industries are headquartered there. Furthermore, trade
secrets law is a state creation that can be best illustrated by high-
lighting a particular state. California's long-arm and service-of-
process statutes are usefully illustrative, too, in typifying state laws
that will authorize in personam jurisdiction over a Japanese defen-
dant. The note considers both substantive and jurisdictional
grounds on which this California plaintiff can build a case.,
The California firm has two causes of action. First, it can pro-
ceed against the ex-employee for breach of contract. The discussion
of this theory is primarily expository, but it does emphasize that
normally the corporation will be better protected in court by a pos-
temployment agreement limited to nondisclosure of trade secrets,
rather than by a broader covenant that prohibits employment with
a competitor as a means of protecting trade secrets. Secondly, the
plaintiff has a cause of action in tort against the Japanese defen-
dant. After considering the applicable tort theory, the note argues
that the defendant, though a resident of Japan, is subject to in
personam jurisdiction chiefly by virtue of the state's long-arm stat-
1. Criminal remedies are outside the scope of this discussion, but it is at least worth
noting that CAL. PENAL CODE § 499(c) (Deering 1971) specifically protects trade secrets from
theft. No alien defendant has yet been prosecuted for violating the section. For a case involv-
ing a domestic defendant prosecuted under the statute, see People v. Serrata, 62 Cal. App.
3d 9, 133 Cal. Rptr. 144 (1976). Under federal laws covering racketeering and transportation
of stolen goods in interstate and foreign commerce, the Department of Justice has recently
charged Mitsubishi Plastics Industries, Ltd., Mitsubishi Chemical Industries, Ltd., three
Japanese nationals, and two United States citizens with stealing trade secrets and transport-
ing them in interstate and foreign commerce. United States v. Farrar, Criminal No. 78-114
(D.S.C., filed Aug. 8, 1978). The statutes involved are 18 U.S.C. §§ 1961, 1962(c)(d), 1963(a),
and 2314 (1977), as amended by Act of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-452, § 901(a), 84 Stat. 941.
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ute and because of state and federal provisions that permit notice
by mail in such a situation. On the assumption that the plaintiff
prevails, the discussion suggests enforcing the judgment in the
United States or in a third country rather than in Japan, where its
enforceability would be less certain.
Why an American plaintiff and a Japanese defendant? His-
tory's wide-ranging examples of commercial espionage-a French-
man stealing the secret of procelain from the Chinese, an English-
man stealing the same secret from the French 2-suggest that trade
secrets theft is as extensive as trade and human nature. In the
computer era, American defendants have certainly been adjudged
culpable for trade secrets misappropriation on a grand scale.3 Expe-
2. J. BERGIER, SECRET ARMIES: THE GROWTH OF CORPORATE AND INDUSTRIAL ESPIONAGE 4-5
(1975).
3. Telex Corp. v. International Business Machines Corp., 367 F. Supp. 258 (N.D. Okla.
1973), 510 F.2d 897 (10th Cir. 1975), involved a plot similar to that stated in the hypothetical
case. A partial review of this complicated litigation illustrates the plot and the astounding
economic consequences it can have.
As the leading market force in the computer industry, IBM over the years has announced
new products that smaller companies have imitated in order to ride on the crest of IBM's
market power as much as to follow its changes in technology. The IBM products typically
imitated have not been the complex and expensive central processing units (CPU's) so much
as less expensively produced peripheral devices that plug into the CPU's, devices such as
terminals, tape files, disk files, and add-on memories. Competitive peripherals are known as
plug-compatible because they are constructed to interface with the IBM CPU.
Telex sued IBM on antitrust charges and won in federal district court. The appellate
court overturned the verdict for the plaintiff because it considered erroneous the trial court's
definition of market share. Telex Corp. v. International Business Machines Corp., 510 F.2d
894 (10th Cir. 1975). The case's noteworthy feature in the context of this note is that IBM
prevailed in the lower court on a counterclaim for trade secret misappropriation, and the
Tenth Circuit affirmed this part of the verdict.
The district court found that Telex had systematically hired key IBM employees who
had not signed fixed-term employment contracts or noncompetition covenants, but all had
agreed to respect IBM trade confidences, either expressly or impliedly by reason of discus-
sions or general conditions of employment. IBM's counterclaims involved several of its prod-
ucts. A claim involving a tape drive and control unit code-named Aspen is representative.
In 1966, basic work began on the Aspen, which eventually embodied design characteris-
tics that IBM treated as confidential. When Aspen was first publicly announced in November
1970, the existence of some of these features was disclosed, but their design and means of
implementation were not divulged. In spite of IBM's precautions, Telex president Jack James
had revealed confidential Aspen information to his company's management nearly nine
months before the Aspen announcement. At that time, James stated an intention to manufac-
ture a plug-compatible replacement. An important part of his plan was recruiting an IBM
engineer in charge of Aspen control unit development, Howard Gruver. To build an Aspen-
type control unit, Telex offered Gruver more than twice the total compensation he received
at IBM. He joined Telex in July 1970. In 1965, while at IBM, Gruver had executed a confiden-
tial information and invention agreement. On departing the company he was informed in an
interview and in a letter he acknowledged in writing that he was obliged not to reveal certain
trade secrets and confidential information. Gruver violated his obligation by producing an
Aspen-competitive product for Telex. Largely because of his disclosures, Telex was able to
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rience indicates, however, that American defendants will not have
a monopoly in such trade secrets disputes. Given Japan's goals for
its computer technology enterprises, the possibility of a confronta-
tion between an American plaintiff and a Japanese defendant does
not seem unrealistic.
In its bid for a sizable share4 of a computer market dominated
by apprehensive Americans, Japan has made no secret of its convic-
tion that computers are central to its economic future.5 The world's
leading importer of oil, coal, cotton, and similar raw materials
wants to lessen its dependence on foreign supplies.' Matched with
low-paying, labor-intensive foreign competition in industries such
as shipbuilding, Japan is losing business to Yugoslavia, Taiwan,
and South Korea. By shifting emphasis from materials to processes,
announce its product a month after IBM announced Aspen and to deliver its product two
months after IBM's Aspen delivery. The court awarded IBM $4.5 million for the monthly
rentals of which it had been deprived. To compensate IBM for the $10 million it had spent
on Aspen development, the court assessed Telex an additional $3 million on the basis of
unjust enrichment.
The district court's total counterclaim judgment for all IBM products was $20.9 million.
The appellate court reduced this figure to $17.5 million, of which $1 million was punitive
damages. $7.5 million of this sum was an affirmance of the Aspen award. (The damages
formulae are discussed in 367 F. Supp. 258, 320-321, 363, and in 510 F.2d 894, 928-933.) The
judgment could have been disastrous for Telex, but in exchange for Telex's promise not to
petition for certiorari, IBM agreed to settle out of court. Smith, I.B.M. and Telex Halt
Litigation, N.Y. Times, Oct. 4, 1975, at 33, col. 5. IBM's impetus for settling was the size of
the district court's award to Telex on its antitrust claims: $259.5 million plus $1.2 million in
attorney's fees and costs.
An interesting international aspect of the Telex case occurred in August 1972, when
Telex's president was negotiating a contract with Hitachi. One of his inducements to contract
was Telex employees' information on unannounced IBM disk programs. This information
would have allowed Hitachi to design an equivalent to IBM's unannounced Apollo disk file.
Even at the time of the trial, the district court found that Telex had expressed to Hitachi,
with whom it was cooperating on product development, an intention of forwarding to Japan
confidential data on IBM CPU's 367 F. Supp. 325, 327 (N.D.Okla. 1973).
For another case that exemplifies comparable trade secrets issues, particularly as regards
ex-employees' breach of nondisclosure agreements, see Sperry Rand Corporation v. Pentro-
nix, Inc., 311 F. Supp. 910 (E.D. Pa. 1970).
4. The goal of the Ministry for International Trade and Industry (MITI) is a ten-percent
share of the world market, according to an official of that body quoted in Uttal, Japans Big
Push in Computers, FoRTuNE, Sept. 25, 1978, at 64, 72. Some industry observers predict a
fifteen-percent share within five years. Douglas, Letter from Tokyo (3): The Great Computer
Race: The next gneration of computers may be introduced by Japanese companies, not
American ones, 113 ScIENcE NEws, Jan. 28, 1978, at 60, 61.
5. "MITI has declared that the information industry is the strategic industry of the
future and has set the goal of increasing computer exports at the dizzying rate of 30.4 percent
a year through 1985. By then, the ministry hopes, Japan will be exporting 16-percent of its
production, or nearly $2 billion worth of gear." Uttal, supra note 4, at 65.
6. Douglas, Japanese Science & Technology (I): "Japan Inc." Musters Its Technical
Strength for Competition in the Post-Industrial Age, 112 SCmNCE NEws, Dec. 3, 1977 at 378,
380.
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by capitalizing on knowledge rather than, labor, the country is aim-
ing to safeguard its economic vitality, according to Hiroshi Kumagi,
a member of the Japanese Diet and one-time first deputy chief of
the Information Processing Promotion Division of the Ministry for
International Trade and Industry (MITI).7 In competing in the com-
puter marketplace, the Japanese are well aware that they are taking
on IBM, the formidable giant that routed the likes of RCA and GE,
but they are methodically preparing themselves for the contest.
In the early 1970's, MITI coordinated a campaign to reduce
IBM's market share in Japan, estimated then at as high as 70%.8
The six major Japanese computer manufacturers paired off into
three groups to produce a system competitive with IBM's 370 se-
ries.9 The Japanese hoped to capture more than half the domestic
market before April 1976, MITI's deadline for removing computer
import barriers.'0 The effort met with success, and by November
1975 the IBM market share had been cut in two."
The Japanese have not restricted their sights to Japan, how-
ever. They are striving for a considerable worldwide market. In
order to obtain it they are collaborating on very large scale inte-
grated circuits (VLSI) that will inaugurate a new era in computer
technology by making a quantum transition from the present chip
limit of tens of thousands of circuits to a chip capacity of hundreds
of thousands of circuits.' 2
Again acting as sponsor, MITI has organized the VLSI Technol-
ogy Research Association, in which all major and two smaller com-
puter makers are collaborating to research and develop products
that will be manufactured by Mitsubishi and an alliance of Fujitsu
7. Yasaki, Is There A Japan, Inc.?, DATAMATION, Jan. 1978, at 106, 108. An anonymous
MITI official says that the information industry is the "nervous system of the future economy,
the technology that will help us cope with the limits to industrialization, such as pollution
and finite resources." Quoted in Uttal, supra note 4, at 72.
8. Ofusa, Japanese Gird for I.B.M. Computer Fray, N.Y. Times, Nov. 29, 1975, at 42,
col. 1. The 70% figure stated by Ofusa is labeled inaccurate byIBM board chairman Frank
Cary in a letter printed in the N.Y. Times, Dec. 14, 1975, § 3, at 8, col. 2.
9. The six Japanese computer corporations are Fujitsu Ltd., Hitachi Ltd., Toshiba, the
Nippon Electric Company, Mitsubishi Electric, and Oki Electric. Ofusa, supra note 8. The
group now consists of "the big five," Oki no longer being among their number, perhaps
because of Oki's poor record with its COSMO series. Uttal, supra note 4, at 68.
10. The effects of Japan's lowering trade barriers on computer products is discussed in
Uttal, supra note 4, at 65.
11. Ofusa, supra note 8.
12. Chips are made of silicon, which according to one definition is "[a] metallic element
often mixed with iron or steel during smelting to provide desirable magnetic properties for
transformer-core materials. In its pure state, it is used as a semiconductor." R. GRAF, MODERN
DICTIONARY OF ELECTRONICS 664 (3rd ed. 1963).
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and Hitachi.' 3 The association shares technical data with a VLSI
project conducted by the Nippon Telegraph and Telephone Public
Corporation, which is receiving help from the Ministry of Posts and
Telecommunications." MITI wants Japan to catch up with IBM on
VLSI production. "The development of Japan's super-large scale
integrated circuits is," according to a high-ranking MITI official,
"an important national undertaking requiring cooperation between
the Government and industry.
15
Japan has already achieved prominence in the world of com-
puters, even though its share of the world market is estimated at
about 4%.11 The country's domestic computer industry is unique in
not being dominated by U.S. firms. Japan ranks second in the num-
ber of installed computers,17 and it may stand first in average usage
rate.' 8 Most important of all, it is increasing its exports.'9 Fujitsu,
which has sold its most sophisticated machine to the Spanish Na-
tional Telegraph Company, recently underbid IBM on a $36 million
computer network for Australia. Hitachi has obtained contracts for
three large computers that will go to the People's Republic of
China.20 Some industry observers are predicting that by 1983 the
13. Douglas, supra note 4, at 61. "MITI has helped to organize a breakthrough project,
convincing Fujitsu, Hitachi, and Mitsubishi to form one research group and NEC and To-
shiba another. From 1976 through 1979, the government will have contributed $150 million
of an estimated total budget of $360 million to develop advanced versions of the most basic
computer components-silicon chips. The Japanese are trying to develop memory chips sixty
times denser than those commonly used today and logic chips several times as fast. The point
is to leapfrog I.B.M.'s next generation of hardware." Uttal, Exports Won't Come Easy for
Japan's Computer Industry, FORTUNE, Oct. 9, 1978, at 138, 142.
14. Douglas, supra note 4.
15. Ofusa, supra note 8. The apparent identity of government and business in Japan is
an indigenous phenomenon that has been much discussed. Three brief and readable explana-
tions are: STEVENS, JAPANESE LEGAL SYSTEM AND TRADITIONS, CURRENT LEGAL AsPECTs OF DOING
BusiNESs IN THE FAR EAST: Proceedings of an American Bar Association National Institute
sponsored by the Section of International Law 2-17 (1972); Angelo, Big Business and the Law
in Japan-An Historical and Contemporary Conspectus, 8 VicromA U. OF WELLINGTON L.
REV. 115 (1976-1977); and Johnson, The Japanese Legal Milieu and its Relationship to
Business, 13 AM. Bus. L.J. 335 (1976). A good collection of essays is MODERN JAPANESE
ORGANIZATION AND DECISION-MAKNG (Vogel, ed. 1975).
16. Douglas, supra note 4.
17. "Now Japan's computer market is the next largest in the world after the U.S.'s, with
more than $14 billion worth of computers in operation. Everywhere else in the world, U.S.
companies hold at least 60 percent of the market, but in Japan, the total foreign share is only
about 43 percent." Uttal, supra note 4, at 66.
18. Douglas, supra note 4.
19. "Japanese exports of all computer gear increased by at least 60 percent in 1976, but
then grew by a meager 4 percent last year. Exports will come to only about 5 percent of total
production, or roughly $200 million, this year." Uttal, supra note 4, at 64.
20. Douglas, supra note 4, at 76.
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Japanese world market share could rise to 15%.21
At the 1977 National Computer Conference in Dallas, the con-
sensus was that the Japanese wanted a significant share of the inter-
national semiconductor demand. 22 Much of their immediate success
in semiconductor circuitry was attributed to standard American
designs. "We fear the Japanese ability to exploit what we develop
and come in and compete with a quality product," said L. J. Sevin,
a semiconductor company executive. 23 George M. Low, president of
the Rensselaer Polytechnic Institute, expressed the same concern at
a joint meeting of the American Institue of Aeronautics and Astron-
autics and the Franklin Institute. Japanese technologists "are beat-
ing us at our own game," he said, by "taking a relatively advanced
piece of equipment, analyzing it, and then taking the next step in
technology to improve it, to produce it more efficiently, to make it
less expensive, or better, or more efficient and more reliable." 4 Low
thinks that the Japanese thrust is toward competition with Ameri-
can high technology ventures in general, a theme emphasized by the
president of the National Semiconductor Corporation, Charles
Sporck, in March 1978: "Japan's prime target today is the data
processing industry [computers]. Domination of the semiconduc-
tor market in the United States is only a part of an overall strategy
that intends to gain control of the computer industry in this coun-
try."'- The Japanese Spies in Silicon Valley, an article in the Febru-
ary 27, 1978 issue of FORTUNE, underscores the seriousness of the
American-Japanese confrontation. "There's a war on and both sides
know it," one American executive claims.21 In California's Santa
Clara Valley, where computer electronics firms are concentrated,
resentment is keen because of the subterfuges allegedly employed
by Japanese agents working out of liaison offices of companies like
21. Id. For a detailed analysis, see Japanese Markets, 51 ELECTRONICS, Jan. 5, 1978, at
143-48.
22. A semiconductor is material that functions normally as an electrical insulator, but
it becomes a conductor when the temperature is raised or when it is modified by small
amounts of a foreign atom. Semiconductors are important in technology because their electri-
cal characteristics are fairly easily adjusted. They are used principally in transistors. A.
BULLOCK AND 0. STALLYBRASS, THE HARPER DICTIONARY OF MODERN THOUGHT 566 (1977).
23. McElheny, Japanese Bidding for U.S. Market in Basic Semiconductor Circuitry,
N.Y. Times, June 20, 1977, at 43, col. 6.
24. McElheny, Technology: Electronics and Incentives, N.Y. Times, Mar. 29, 1978, § D,
at 10, col. 5.
25. Id. "William Givens, president of Twain Associates, a consulting firm that special-
izes in U.S.-Japan trade and investment, argues that the future of Japan's computer industry
is the central issue of our times. 'If they can achieve their goals with computers,' says Givens,
'it could ensure their general economic dominance well into the twenty-first century."' Uttal,
supra note 13, at 146.
26. Bylinsky, The Japanese Spies in Silicon Valley, FORTUNE, Feb. 27, 1978, at 74.
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Fujitsu and Hitachi.Y A principal strategem, according to irate local
executives, is a consultation fee-ranging from $500 a day to a
$60,000 total-paid to a knowledgeable person for his former em-
ployer's confidential information. 28
In our hypothetical case involving computer technology trade
secrets, a California company is claiming that a Japanese defendant
has wrongfully acquired confidential data from the California or-
ganization's ex-employee. A necessary preface to examining the
plaintiffs two causes of action is a definition of trade secrets that
epitomizes liabilities for improper revelation and use of confidential
trade information. Primary authorities in this prefatory section are
the Restatement of Torts, the standard definitional authority in
trade secrets cases, and Kewanee Oil Co. v. Bicron Corp.,2 the
Supreme Court's most detailed consideration of trade secrets law to
date.
TRADE SECRETS: WHAT THE LAW PROTECTS
The now classic definition of a trade secret is set forth in the
Restatement of Torts § 757 (1939), which discusses liability for dis-
closure or use of another's trade secret. 0 "A trade secret may consist
of any formula, pattern, device or compilation of information which
is used in one's business, and which gives him an opportunity to
obtain an advantage over competitors who do not know or use it.' 31
27. Id. at 75.
28. Id.
29. 416 U.S. 470 (1974).
30. Time and again the courts have used the trade secret definition of the Restatement
of Torts § 757 comment b. Some cases have incorporated the definition into their reasoning
without taking the time to espouse it; see, for instance, Sarkes Tarzian, Inc. v. Audio Devices,
Inc., 166 F. Supp. 250, 257 (1958); Ungar Electric Tools, Inc. v. Sid Ungar Co., 192 Cal. App.
2d 398, 403, 13 Cal. Rptr. 268, 271 (1961); By-Buk Company v. Printed Cellophane Company,
163 Cal. App. 2d 157, 166, 329 P.2d 147, 152 (1958); other cases draw attention to their use of
the definition, as for example, B. F. Goodrich v. Wohlgemuth, 117 Ohio App. 493, 498, 192
N.E.2d 99, 104 (1963). "We adopt for the purposes of this case, the elements of trade secrets
as they are set forth in 4 Restatement of the Law of Torts, Sec. 757 b"; Winston Research
Corp. v. Minnesota Min. & Mfg. Co., 350 F.2d 134, n.3, at 139-40 (9th Cir. 1965), "California
has adopted the Restatement's definition of a trade secret"; Sinclair v. Aquarius Electronics,
Inc., 42 Cal. App. 3d 216, 221, 116 Cal. Rptr. 654 (1974), states that the definition "is now
settled"; Tri-Tron Intl. v. Velto, 525 F.2d 432, 436 (9th Cir. 1975), "The courts in California,
where much of the action took place, have adopted and rely upon § 757 as the law of that
state"; Kewanee Oil Co. v. Bicron Corp., 415 U.S. 470, 474 (1974), "Ohio has adopted the
widely relied-upon definition of a trade secret found at Restatement of Torts § 757, comment
b (1939)."
31. RFSTATEmwET OF TORTS § 757, comment b at 6. Roger M. Milgrim says that "use"
here and in other definitions raises a factual question which should acknowledge that in
modern, complex enterprises an idea may deserve protection not only when it is ready for
the market but also when it is being researched and developed: "Use of secrets at the precom-
No. 1]
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Admitting that no precise definition is possible, the Restatement
points to traits that may identify a trade secret: (1) the extent to
which confidential information is known outside the business, (2)
the extent to which employees and others involved in the business
know it, (3) the extent to which its secrecy has been guarded, (4)
its value to the owner as well as to competitors, (5) the amount of
money expended in developing the information, and (6) the ease or
difficulty that others would have in properly acquiring or duplicat-
ing it.32
Three of these traits concern secrecy, since a trade secret is the
peculiar possession of the business that uses it. 33 In contrast, general
information is not secret and is nobody's private property. Ob-
viously a trade secret may be confided to employees who need it or
to others pledged to silence.34 Even so, secrecy must be so substan-
tial that improper access to the information would be difficult.35 The
fourth and fifth items on the Restatement's list deal with the infor-
mation's trade worth, which might be weighed on scales of either
mercial stages is a vital business use, and just as surely provides a competitive advantage to
the owner of such secrets because it affords him something of immeasurable value, a head-
start [citations omitted]." 12 R. MILGRIM, BUSINESS ORGANIZATIONS: TRADE SECRETS §
2.02[1], at 2-16 (1978 ed. & Supp. 1978) [hereinafter cited as 12 MILwmM].
32. RESTATEMENT OF TORTS § 757, comment b at 6.
33. Id. Trade secrets must be the particular secrets of an employer as distinguished from
the general secrets of the trade, according to Sarkes Tarzian, Inc. v. Audio Devices, Inc., 166
F. Supp. 250, 265 (S.D. Cal. 1958), where the court also remarks that "Trade practices, to
come within the obligation of secrecy must be secret. While they need not amount to inven-
tion, in the patent law sense, they must, at least, amount to discovery." An employer should
not apply the trade secret label casually. As C. F. Leydig points out, designating as secret
an indiscriminately large segment of business will simply dilute precautions applied to criti-
cal areas. LEvnxo, Protecting Trade Secrets When Employees Move, 21 Bus. LAw. 325, 335
(1966).
34. "[T]here are two common law doctrines on secrecy: (1) absolute secrecy, and (2)
relative secrecy . . . .[T]he better rule is the majority view of relative secrecy, which has
been adopted by the Restatement § 757. It requires only a substantial element of secrecy.
[citation omitted.] The issue of whether such degree of secrecy exists in a particular case is
one of fact, rather than one of law. . . .Additionally, it is clear that the California courts
follow the doctrine of relative secrecy. [citation omitted.]" Tri-Tron, Int'l v. Velto, 525 F.2d
432, 436 (9th Cir. 1975).
35. "Plaintiff's trade secret claims must fail because as to those in issue at trial no real
effort was made by plaintiff prior to trial to keep them secret. They were also either revealed
in the marketed product; fully disclosed by issued patents; generally known to those skilled
in the industry or trade; or consisted of information easily acquired by persons in the industry
from patents, literature or known processes. . . ." Motorola, Inc. v. Fairchild Camera and
Instrument Corp., 366 F. Supp. 1173, 1186 (D.Ariz. 1973). This court also took into account
that the plaintiff's employees regularly conducted tours of the area where allegedly secret
products were being made, without giving warnings to or requiring nondisclosure agreements
from those taking the tours. "Essentially," Milgrim notes, "the courts require that the posses-
sor of a trade secret take reasonable measures to protect its secrecy." 12 MILGRIM, supra note
31, § 2.04, at 2-26 (citations omitted).
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commercial value or development cost.36 The sixth item on the
checklist refers to the ease or difficulty of properly obtaining or
copying the information. The concept of propriety brings to the
foreground the issue of legal values.
Liability for disclosing or using another's trade secret has been
predicated on several theories, among them an exclusive property
right and unfair competition,3 7 but according to the Restatement,
"[The theory that has prevailed is that the protection is afforded
only by a general duty of good faith and that the liability rests upon
a breach of this duty; that is, breach of contract, abuse of confidence
or impropriety in the method of ascertaining the secret." 3 The law
is not fostering secrecy as an end in itself. Rather, the aim is to
provide a remedy for breach of faith and reprehensible means of
acquiring another's trade secret. 3 Defendants will thus belong to
one of two classes: (1) those who have breached an implicit or ex-
plicit obligation to respect the confidence, or (2) those who wrong-
fully obtain the information, for instance by "fraudulent misrepre-
sentations to induce disclosure, tapping of telephone wires, eaves-
dropping or other espionage."4 Outside these classes anyone is free
to copy and use a trade secret, and he will not be held liable for
destroying what was previously a proprietary advantage." Patent
law, in contrast, forbids even innocent reproduction of a patented
process or device, but the price for the patent monopoly is publica-
tion (making open or "patent") and a limited term of protection.
Although trade secret protection might be perpetual, it could termi-
nate when another comes upon the secret properly, such as by re-
verse engineering, by independent invention, or by the owner's gift
or sale.12 Thus, the Restatement emphasizes the obligation to re-
36. See 12 MILGRIM, supra note 31, § 2.02[2].
37. Ch. 1 in 12 MiwiuM, supra note 31, Trade Secrets as Property, presents a persuasive
argument for the property theory. Appendix G in 12A MILGRIM, Employee Enticement and
Antitrust by N. Yoerg, Jr., argues convincingly that "[t]he Sherman Act was not intended
to be a catch-all statute creating federal causes of action out of torts [such as trade secrets
misappropriation] normally cognizable under state law." 12A R. MILGRIM, BusINESs
ORGAIZATIONS: Trade Secrets, APPENDIX G at G-54 (1978 ed. & Supp. 1978).
38. RESTATEMENT OF TORTS § 759 comment a at 4.
39. Id. comment b at 7.
40. Id. comment f at 11.
41. "It is a rule of law that there is nothing unlawful in copying the unpatented products
of another down to the last detail. . . ." Cornell-Dubilier Elec. Corp. v. Aerovox Corp., 71
U.S. P.Q. 153, 156 (Mass. Super. Ct. 1946). For similar citations, see 12 MILGRIM, supra note
31, n.4 § 2.05[2] at 2-37.
42. See CAL. CIV. CODE § 984 (Deering 1971) on subsequent and original production: "If
the owner of an invention or design does not make it public, any other person subsequently
and originally producing the same thing has the same right therein as the prior inventor,
No. 1]
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spect a trade confidence. A secret that is published ceases to exist.13
Trade secret principles derive from state common law. Since
trade secret law and the federal law of patents protect commercial
ingenuity, the two systems might seem to create a conflict that
would require federal interests to preempt state regulation." In
Lear, Inc. v. Adkins, the United States Supreme Court considered
"whether federal patent policy bars a State from enforcing a con-
tract regulating access to a secret idea."45 The majority declined to
answer the question, but in a dissent, Justice Black, whom Justice
Douglas joined, resolved the issue unambiguously: "[N]o State has
a right to authorize any kind of monopoly on what is claimed to be
a new invention, 'except when a patent has been obtained from the
Patent Office under the exacting standards of the patent laws." '46
The dissenters condemned trade secret licensing as altogether con-
trary to national patent policy. By implication, the legitimacy of
trade secret law in any guise was suspect. Finally, however, the
Supreme Court resolved the apparent conflict in Kewanee Oil Co.
v. Bicron Corp.4 The Court's distinctions between trade secret and
patent protection are worth summarizing here because of their defi-
nitional utility.
The Court announced that the issue in Kewanee was "whether
state trade secret protection is pre-empted by operation of the fed-
eral patent law. ' 48 The question had arisen from a conflict between
an employer and his ex-employees. By using many techniques that
it considered trade secrets, a manufacturer of synthetic crystal
spent approximately seventeen years and more than $1 million to
grow a seventeen-inch crystal. The crystal it had originally pro-
duced was less than two inches in diameter. Employees who had
signed agreements not to disclose the manufacturer's trade secret
information eventually left their jobs to form a competing corpora-
tion. Within a year they had grown their own seventeen-inch crys-
tal. A federal district court in Ohio enjoined the ex-employees from
disclosing or using the trade 'secrets. The prohibition was to be
permanent unless disclosure came about by legitimate means. The
Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit reversed because it found
which is exclusive to the same extent against all persons except the prior inventor, or those
claiming under him."
43. See 12 MILGiuM, supra note 31, § 2.03, at 2-22, 2-23.
44. Under the Supremacy Clause of the United States Constitution, art. VI., § 2, federal
legislation is preemptive in the event of conflict with state law.
45. 395 U.S. 653, 672 (1969).
46. Id. at 677 (Black, J., dissenting).
47. Kewanee Oil Co. v. Bicron Corp., 416 U.S. 470 (1974).
48. Id. at 472.
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Ohio trade secret law in conflict with United States patent law.49
Ohio could not grant a monopoly for possibly patentable subject
matter that had been used publicly for more than a year before
patent application. On appeal, the United States Supreme Court
reversed the Sixth Circuit. Federal patent law, it held, did not
preempt Ohio's trade secrets law. A corollary of the decision was
approval of Ohio's using the trade secrets definition from the Re-
statement of Torts § 737, comment b (1939).
The Court said that federal law would indubitably take preced-
ence over state law should the two clash on patent or copyright
regulation, but the majority found no inherent conflict between the
law of patents and that of trade secrets. The two bodies of law afford
different protection in exchange for different restrictions:
The protection accorded the trade secret holder is against the
disclosure or unauthorized use of the trade secret by those to whom
the secret has been confided under the express or implied restric-
tion of nondisclosure or nonuse. The law also protects the holder
of a trade secret against disclosure or use when the knowledge is
gained, not by the owner's volition, but by some "improper
means," Restatement of Torts § 757(a), which may include theft,
wiretapping, or even aerial reconnaissance. A trade secret law,
however, does not offer protection against discovery by fair and
honest means, such as by independent invention, accidental dis-
closure, or by so-called reverse engineering, that is by starting with
the known product and working backward to divine the process
which aided in its development or manufacture."'
In marked contrast to trade secrets law, patent law fulfills a consti-
tutional objective of promoting the progress of science and the use-
ful arts5 by compensating the inventor with a monopoly effective
against the whole world, including those who independently make
the same discovery. The price for the exclusion is full disclosure in
the approved application. When the seventeen-year monopoly ex-
pires, the public has the benefit of the new knowledge.
Some trade secrets do not or might not meet the patentability
criteria of novelty, utility, and nonobviousness.5 2 Other trade se-
crets, however, do satisfy the criteria, yet their owners choose not
to seek patents. The Court nevertheless did not believe that trade
secret law deters applications for patents that are likely to be
granted. Four reasons support this conclusion: (1) trade secrets law
49. 35 U.S.C. § 102(b) (1977).
50. Kewanee Oil Co. v. Bicron Corp., 416 U.S. 470, 475-76 (1974).
51. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
52. 35 U.S.C. §§ 101-03 (1977).
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does not protect the holder from independent discovery, (2) "The
holder of a trade secret also takes a substantial risk that the secret
will be passed on to his competitors, by theft or by breach of a
confidential relationship, in a manner not easily susceptible of dis-
covery or proof,"53 (3) an unpatented invention publicly used for
more than a year may not be patented,54 and (4) the "ripeness of
time" concept suggests that "[i]f something is likely to be discov-
ered at all very likely it will be discovered by more than one per-
son,"' 5 especially when marketing alerts the competition to a solu-
tion. The Court concluded that "[t]rade secret law encourages the
development and exploitation of those items of lesser or different
invention than might be accorded protection under the patent laws,
but which items still have an important part to play in the technol-
ogical and scientific advancement of the Nation."56
In a concurring opinion, Justice Marshall did not agree that
there is a remote chance that the inventor of a patentable invention
will prefer trade secret to patent protection. I fact, he asserted that
the existence of trade secret protection sometimes provides a sub-
stantial disincentive to patenting. By its awareness and tolerance of
the trade secrets system over the years, Congress has not meant to
exert pressure on inventors to patent but instead has allowed them
alternative means of legal protection. Marshall regarded the two
systems as coordinate.
Marshall's analysis reflects an accurate perception of business
practice. Manufacturers, particularly in the computer industry,
quite commonly rely on trade secret protection even when a patent
monopoly would probably be available. For manufacturers of highly
competitive and rapidly innovative technology, patent application
is so time consuming that new technology would very likely be obso-
lete by the time it was patented. Rather than waste time and money
on such a fruitless undertaking, computer manufacturers are wont
to rely on, and take the risks of, trade secret protection.
PROTECTION FROM AN EX-EMPLOYEE'S
DISCLOSURE
A person who accepts and then breaches a confidence is liable
for the breach, whether or not he is bound contractually.17 The hypo-
53. Kewanee Oil Co. v. Bicron Corp., 416 U.S. 470, 490. The Court is citing Painton &
Co. v. Bourns, Inc., 442 F.2d 216, 224 (2d Cir. 1971).
54. 35 U.S.C. § 102(b) (1977).
55. Kewanee Oil Co. v. Bicron Corp., 416 U.S. 470, 490.
56. Id., at 493.
57. RESTATEMENT OF TORTS § 757(b), comment j at 13 (1939).
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thetical problem set out at the beginning of this note assumes that
the California corporation has followed a standard practice in re-
quiring the employee to promise in writing that he will not disclose
the corporation's confidential trade information if he terminates
employment. Such an agreement is often thought of as a noncompe-
tition covenant, but if it were treated more narrowly as a nondisclo-
sure agreement the interests of both the employer and the ex-
employee would be better served.
If a written contract delineates an employee's duty to respect a
trade confidence, the Restatement of Torts indicates that the Re-
statement of Contracts will apply." The latest tenative draft of the
Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 328, states that if a promisor
unreasonably restricts himself from gainful employment, his prom-
ise is an unenforceable restraint of trade. 9 This rule is subject to the
further qualification that the promise may be enforceable if it is part
of-i.e., ancillary to-another transaction or relationship.60 Further-
more, the restraint must be only what is necessary to protect the
promisee's legitimate interest." The promisee's need must outweigh
the hardship imposed on the promisor and the public.6 2 "A promise
by an employee or other agent not to compete with his employer or
other principal" could be valid, then, under these special condi-
tions."
In a trade secrets context, the conflicting interests of employer
and employee are perhaps more difficult to separate than usual.
"The conflict between the employer's right to protect his trade se-
crets and the employee's right not to be unreasonably hampered in
the use of what he has learned during the employment is," accord-
58. Id.
59. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 328 (Tent. Draft No. 12, 1977). See generally,
id. Topic 2 §§ 328-30.
60. Id. § 329. Comment b to this section states that the ancillary promise may be made
initially or before the relationship terminates, but subsequent to the relationship, the promise
will be non-ancillary and unenforceable. The general rule is that the employment is adequate
consideration for the restrictive covenant, which means that if the restrictive covenant is
made after the employment has begun, new consideration may be necessary. 12 MILGRIM,
supra note 31, § 3.05[1], at 3-80 to 3-82.
61. Id. § 330.
62. RESTATEMENT (SEcoND) OF CONTRACTS, supra note 59, § 330. The history of postem-
ployment noncompetitive covenants and the balance of conflicting interests that can some-
times justify them are considered in Blake, Employee Agreements Not to Compete, 73 HAZv.
L. REV. 625 (1960) [hereinafter cited as Blake]. For a chatty discussion of the problem, see
Employee Versus Company Interests in Trade Secrets and Patents, 10 IDEA 67 (Conference
Number 1966).
63. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS, supra note 59, § 330. For a review in some
detail of covenants ancillary to an employment contract, see 54 Am. JuR. 2d Monopolies §§
542-80.
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ing to Callmann, "the crux of the problem."n64 The Restatement
(Second) of Contracts comments that any postemployment re-
straint should be carefullly scrutinized, whenever made and how-
ever broad. Often an employee with little bargaining power has not
given sufficient attention to the distress he could later suffer.
A line must be drawn between the general skills and knowledge of
the trade and information that is peculiar to the employer's busi-
ness. If the employer seeks to justify the restraint on the ground
of the employee's knowledge of a process or method, the confiden-
tiality of that process or method and its technological life may be
critical.65
Though postemployment restraints are normally disapproved, they
will be upheld to keep an employee from appropriating valuable
trade information learned during employment. 6 A more immediate
benefit of a limited restraint is that it can encourage efficiency. If
an employer knows that he can rely on such a restraint, he will
probably feel that he can safely entrust confidential information to
an employee."
In California, the conflicting interests of employer and em-
ployee are reflected in statutory law. Section 16600 of the Business
and Professions Code states that "[E]xcept as provided in this
chapter every contract by which anyone is restrained from engaging
in a lawful profession, trade, or business of any kind is to that extent
void." 8 In contrast, Section 2860 of the Labor Code says that every-
thing lawfully or unlawfully acquired by virtue of employment be-
longs to the employer, with the exception of the employee's compen-
sation. The provision applies after as well as during employment."
In applying the Labor Code statute, the courts have recognized
employers' rights to trade secrets, thus tempering the strong prohi-
bition against postemployment contractual restraints stated in the
Business and Professions Code.70 Exceptions have been scrupulously
admitted, however, as Sarkes Tarzian, Inc. v. Audio Devices, Inc.
indicates:
64. 2 R. CALLMANN, THE LAw OF UNFAIR COMPETITION TRADEMARKS AND MONOPOLIES § 54.2
(3d ed. 1968 & Supp. 1977) [hereinafter cited as CALLMANN].
65. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS, supra note 59, § 330, comment g, at 119-20.
66. Id. comment b, at 114.
67. Id. comment c, at 115. Probably no employer would risk the expense of research and
development if employees were free to walk off with the results. Wexler v. Greenberg, 399
Pa. 569, 579, 160 A.2d 430 (1960); 2 CALLMANN, supra note 64, § 54.2(A), at 417.
68. CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE § 16600 (Deering 1976).
69. CAL. LAB. CODE § 2860 (Deering 1976).
70. See id. at 54-55.
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[Tihere is agreement among the courts that, except, [sic] where
real trade secrets are involved, an employee may compete with his
former employer and use such knowledge and skill as he has devel-
oped in the former's employ. This accords with the main object of
a free economy which is the basis-of our industrial system.7'
In Sarkes Tarzian, the plaintiff was denied recovery because the
court found no trade secrets in issue. The employee-defendants were
consequently free to work for their former employer's competitor.
The same result was reached in Winston Research Corp. v. Minne-
sota Min. & Mfg. Co.,72 in which the court found that no trade
secrets were in issue but only the use of commonly known informa-
tion. The court refused to deprive the ex-employees of their "general
skill, knowledge, and experience, even though acquired in part dur-
ing their employment. '73
To recapitulate, it is clear that courts will protect a trade secret
owner from a misappropriating ex-employee, whether or not the ex-
employee is bound by a written nondisclosure agreement. On the
other hand, it is also apparent that courts generally disapprove of
contractually restricting the employment options of an employee
who leaves his job.74 There is a solution to this dilemma. A written
postemployment agreement, specifically prohibiting trade secret
disclosure and not competition, can accommodate the interests of
employer and employee in a manner that should meet with judicial
approval. The advantages of such a writing should be kept in
mind.7 5
By requiring the employer to carefully consider alternatives, a
writing can sharply focus its purpose. An ancillary agreement in
which nondisclosure is foremost, and not subordinate to a noncom-
petition covenant, is not likely to restrict a worker in his pursuit of
a livelihood.76 The employer can specify terms that fairly balance
71. 166 F. Supp. 250, 264 (S.D. Cal. 1958) (emphasis in the original).
72. 350 F.2d 134 (9th Cir. 1965).
73. Id. at 144.
74. "Were we to measure the sentiment of the law by the weight of both English and
American decisions in order to determine whether it favors protecting a businessman from
certain forms of competition or protecting an individual in his unrestricted pursuit of a
livelihood, the balance would heavily favor the latter." Wexler v. Greenberg, 399 Pa. 569,579,
160 A.2d 430 (1960) (citation omitted). See also, 38 CAL. JuR. 3d Injunctions § 38, on business
and property rights in trade secrets, and 32 CAL.JuR. 2d Master and Servant § 26, on informa-
tion acquired during employment.
75. For a discussion of the advantages and disadvantages of express covenants see 12
MILORIM, supra note 31, ch. 3, Protection of Trade Secrets by Contract.
76. Normally a restraint is enforceable only if the ex-employee presents "a substantial
risk either to the employer's relationships with his customers or with respect to confidential
business information." Blake, supra note 60, at 653. During full-time employment, of course,
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the parties' interests. "Whether a particular covenant will in fact
stand up in court depends not only on the lawyer's skill in drafting
but, more important, on the employer's demonstrable good faith."7
Restraints should apply only to individuals or classes of employees
whose future activities might create a risk of serious damage, and
the limitations should impose only minimal burdens that could be
renegotiated or modified as needed.7 As the Restatement (Second)
of Contracts indicates, the validity of an ancillary agreement not to
disclose a commercial confidence demands an honest appraisal and
a careful counterpoise of all the interests involved-those of the
employer, the employee, and the public. 9
Besides giving the trade secret owner the advantage of defining
purpose, the written bargain also offers the advantage of assuring
foreseeable results. The express agreement establishes the owner's
belief in a trade secrets claim, a belief that may rest on probability
rather than absolute certainty."0 At any rate, a duty must exist
before its breach can be in issue. The owner must know what he
regards as trade secret data before he can expect his employee to
know. Written agreements should be just one part of a security
program,8' since all security measures can stand as strong evidence
that one has a legally protectible trade secret.8 2 A lack of precautions
may justify an inference that no secret exists.8 1 In the opinion of one
an employee may not reveal his employer's trade secrets nor engage in a competitive business,
even after working hours. 2 CALLMANN, supra note 64, § 33.1(b)(1), at 23.
The shield of trade secret protection "is not a substitute for an agreement by the em-
ployee not to compete with his employer after the termination of employment." E. W. Bliss
Co. v. Struthers-Dunn, Inc., 408 F.2d 1108, 1112-13 (8th Cir. 1969); Motorola, Inc. v. Fairchild
Camera & Instrument Corp., 366 F. Supp. 1173, 1186 (D. Ariz. 1973); cf. Ungar Electric Tools,
Inc. v. Sid Ungar Co., 192 Cal. App. 2d 398, 401-02, 13 Cal. Rptr. 268, 270-71 (1961) makes
the same distinction. See also Leydig, supra note 33, at 332-34.
77. Blake, supra note 62, at 687.
78. Id. at 687-88. See also Motorola, Inc. v. Fairchild Camera & Instrument Corp., 366
F. Supp. 1173, 1185 (D. Ariz. 1973), and the Telex trial court's comments on IBM's security
procedures. Telex Corp. v. International Business Machines Corp., 367 F. Supp. 258, 329
(N.D. Okla. 1973).
79. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS, supra note 58, § 330. "[A] fair, workable test
which embodies the better principles of the conflicting authorities" can be found at 12
MILGRIM, supra note 31, § 3.02[2], 3-47 and 3-48. Forms that may be useful in drafting are
available in D. BRANDON, DATA PROCESSING CONTRACTS: STRUCTURE, CONTENTS, AND
NEGOTrTON 186-88, 191, 373, 396, 416-17 (1976), and in 12A R. MILGRIM, BUSINESS ORGANIZA-
TIONS: TRADE SECRETS, App. C., at C-I to C-26 (1978 ed.).
80. 12 MILGRIM, supra note 31, § 3.02[1], at 3-16 to 3-24, 3.05[1], at 3-67 to 3-68.
81. Id. at § 3.02[1](c), at 3-9, 3-10.
82. Leydig, supra note 33, at 328 n. 12.
83. 2 CALLMAN, supra note 64, § 53.1, at 80 (Supp. 1977) (update for Vol. 2, p. 382, n.
66). See also 12 MILGRIM, supra note 31, § 3.02[1](b), at 3-8 to 3-9 (on the clarification of
confidential status).
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prominent authority on trade secrets, an agreement's primary ad-
vantage is that before trial it might provide a basis for enjoining
disclosure that could imperil trade secrets.84 Should litigation be
necessary, however, "[Tihe most persuasive proof possible that
information is worthy of legal protection is that the employer has
taken every feasible step to protect it himself." 5 Obviously a written
agreement would constitute one of these steps. Because direct evi-
dence of misappropriation may be unavailable and because circum-
stantial evidence may be weak," an express agreement would seem
absolutely essential to an employer's case.
A written nondisclosure agreement should also deter misappro-
priation. After all, preventing a violation is more important to an
employer than providing a remedy for one, especially since an in-
junction against disclosure can seldom undo damage. Further-
more, trade secret litigation can be protracted and terribly expen-
sive.u
It has been argued that a nondisclosure agreement is of little
or no value because nearly identical results follow whether or not an
agreement is in writing. 9 This argument ignores evidence that a
written nondisclosure agreement eliminates a standard defense. The
defendant cannot say that the absence of a nondisclosure agreement
proves the absence of fiduciary obligation." In fact, because courts
have shown a propensity to equate the existence of trade secrets
with covenants that protect them,9' contract clauses may have to
define trade secrets and the rights of the parties more carefully than
they have in the past.9 2
84. 12 MILGRIM, supra note 31, § 3.02[1](d), at 3-10 to 3-11. See also B. F. Goodrich
Co. v. Wohlgemuth, 117 Ohio App. 493, 192 N.E.2d 99 (1963).
85. Blake, supra note 62, at 674.
86. 12A R. MILGmIM, BusIEss ORGANIZATIONS: TRADE SECRErS § 7.07[1], at 7-96 (1978
ed.) [hereinafter cited as 12A MILGRIM].
87. Blake, supra note 62, at 670.
88. 12A MILGRIM, supra note 86, § 7.01; see note 3 supra (on the Telex trial and appeal).
89. Kopko, Protection of Trade Secrets in the Employer-Employee Relationship, 39
NOTRE DAME LAW. 200, 209 (1963-1964); and Note, Protection of Inventive Ideas Through
Postemployment Assignment Covenants, 1965 WASH. U.L.Q. 335, 357.
90. Harding, Trade Secrets and the Mobile Employee, 22 Bus. LAW. 395, 402-03 (1967).
91. In Wexler v. Greenberg, 399 Pa. 569, 580, 160 A.2d 430, 435 (1960), the court stated
that since it would have been bound to carefully examine restrictions imposed by covenant,
"[i]t follows that no less stringent an examination of the relationship should be necessary
where the employer has not seen fit to protect himself by binding agreement." (Footnote
omitted.) (Emphasis in original.) In Servomation Mathias, Inc. v. Englert, 333 F. Supp. 9,
14 (M.D. Pa. 1971), a failure to contractually restrict all employees to whom mass food recipes
were disclosed contributed to doubt about the genuineness of the alleged trade secrets.
92. SUTrroN, Developments and Trends in Trade Secret Law, in ATroRNEx's GUIDE TO
TRADE SECRETS, CALIFORNIA CONTINUING EDUCATION OF THE BAR, § 1.7 (C.S. Brosnahan ed.
1971).
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PROTECTION FROM AN ALIEN'S INDUCEMENT OF
DISCLOSURE
The Restatement of Torts imposes liability on one who knows
that he is using or disclosing confidential trade information con-
veyed by a third person whose disclosure breaches a duty to the
owner.9 3 Thus, a competitor who induces disclosure and the rival's
ex-employee who succumbs are both liable for their breach of "a
general duty of good faith," specifically because the competitor
improperly learns the secret and the ex-employee breaches his con-
tract.94 "The protection is merely against breach of faith and repre-
hensible means of learning another's secret. 9 g5 The competitor's in-
tentional inducement of the ex-employee by improper
means-those "which fall below the generally accepted standards of
commercial morality and reasonable conduct" 9"-is thus actionable
as a particular kind of improper procurement.9"
Section 757 of the Restatement of Torts states the general prin-
ciples of liability for use or disclosure of another's trade secret.
Improper procurement is also discussed separately in Section 759,
which states that
One who, for the purpose of advancing a rival business interest,
procures by improper means information about another's business
is liable to the other for the harm caused by his possession, disclo-
sure or use of the information.98
Though Section 759 applies to any kind of business information and
not just to trade secrets, comment b says that improper discovery
will not generally cause harm unless the information is confidential.
In one of the commonest schemes, the competitor acquires
trade secrets after luring another's employee to a more attractive
job. Employers are free to use legal means in competing for the
services of workers,99 but inducing breach of contract to discover
93. RESTATEMENT OF TORTS § 757(c), at 2.
94. Id. § 757, comment a, at 4.
95. Id. comment b, at 7.
96. Id. comment f, at 11.
97. Id. comment h, at 12. The knowledge may be actual or constructive; see RESTATEMENT
OF ToRrs § 757, comment e at 14-15.
98. Id. § 759, at 23.
99. "Lest the impression be created that enticing away one or more employees from a
competitor is sufficient ground upon which to maintain a trade secret action, it is appropriate
to observe that the basic policy of the law is to encourage employee mobility and advance-
ment." !2 MLGUmM, supra note 31, § 5.04[4](d), at 5-115 (footnote omitted). "There is no
tort if, by legal means, one induces an employe[e] to sever his employment with another."
Sarkes Tarzian, Inc. v. Audio Devices, Inc., 166 F. Supp. 250, 264 (1958).
[Vol. 2
Computer Technology Trade Secrets
another's trade secret can constitute the tort of unjustified interfer-
ence with contractual relations. A competitor who knows that the
employment contract exists is liable for the tort if he acts intention-
ally and without justification to injure his rival, if he occasions the
employee's breach, and if he causes the plaintiff to suffer actual
damage. 0 Because directly proving a defendant's intention can be
practically impossible, a plaintiff normally relies on circumstantial
evidence, such as the defendant's systematically hiring employees
at unusually large salaries to work on tasks in which they will be
likely to disclose- the plaintiff's trade secrets. 1'0 1
If the employee has already left his position when the entice-
ment occurs, the competitor is chargeable with interference with
contractual relations only if he knows of a postemployment agree-
ment that prohibits trade secret disclosure. As a rule negligent in-
terference with a contract is not actionable.' 2 An employer who
learns that an ex-employee is working for a competitor would be well
advised to inform the competitor that a nondisclosure agreement
binds the employee to respect certain trade confidences.' 3 If provid-
ing the competitor with notice of the prior obligation does not pre-
vent disclosure, the procedure can have evidentiary weight in litiga-
tion. A nice question of fact is whether any computer industry
manufacturer should not reasonably be expected to know that trade
secrets are commonly protected by postemployment agreements. 0
Deliberately inducing violation of such an agreement evidences
unethical behavior that can stand as damning evidence against the
inducer.
Although the concept of commercial morality or business ethics is
not a legally defined one, reliance upon such terminology would
appear to be increasing. What is lost in technical precision is
gained in reliance upon a formula readily understandable by the
100. Martin, Enticement of Employees, 28 Bus. LAW. 1341, 1342-44 (1973). See also, 2
CALLMANN, supra note 64, § 31.1 (Enticing Employees).
101. 12 MnGorM, supra note 31, § 5.04, at 5-111. The trial court in Telex Corp. v.
International Business Machines Corp., 367 F. Supp. 258, 318-20 (N.D. Okla. 1973) was
influenced by such evidence.
102. W. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS, § 129 at 938-42 (4th ed. 1971).
103. See the district court opinion in Telex Corp. v. International Business Machine
Corp., 367 F. Supp. 258, 328-29 (N.D. Okla. 1973).
104. A survey published in 1965 is cited at 12 MLGamM, supra note 31, § 3.02, 3-7. The
survey indicates that among 86 representative corporations, 58 required research and develop-
ment as well as technical employees- to sign some sort of employment agreement regarding
the employer's patent and trade secret rights. It seems reasonable to assume that at least
comparable statistics would be true today in the computer industry.
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layman. With increasing frequency courts tend to explain the duty
of a disclosee of a trade secret and the wrongfulness of the breach
of that duty in terms of commercial morality. 0 5
Exposing a competitor's moral callousness, by way of demonstrating
his wilful discovery of another's trade secrets, can strengthen a
plaintiff's case, but it is not strictly necessary. Any improper means
of learning trade secrets is grounds for liability. Intentional and
unjustified interference with contractual relations is just one of
those means.
A trade secret owner has sure legal grounds for a cause of action
against one who induces an ex-employee to dislose confidential busi-
ness information, but a court cannot test the plaintiffs theory un-
less it acquires jurisdiction over the defendant. When an alien de-
fendant's only connection with the forum is the alleged tort, a Cali-
fornia court can obtain in personam jurisdiction by using the state's
long-arm provision. In one sentence, the California long-arm statute
extends its reach as far as due process allows: "A court of this state
may exercise jurisdiction on any basis not inconsistent with the
Constitution of this state or of the United States."'' 6 A federal court
sitting in California may use the state long-arm statute, whether a
plaintiffs cause of action arises under state or federal law. Federal
Rule of Civil Procedure 4(e) authorizes use of state procedure for
service on or notice to one who is not an inhabitant of the state or
who is not present there. Section (i) of Rule 4 amplifies section (e)
by detailing alternative provisions for service in a foreign country.
Doing an act in the state, a jurisdictional basis that satisfies the
minimum contacts requirement of International Shoe v.
Washington, ,o best fits the fact situation outlined in the hypotheti-
cal case here. The Japanese defendant's in-state act is the tort of
inducing disclosure of the California corporation's proprietary infor-
mation. When a tort causes a physical injury, determining the state
in which the injury occurred is a simple matter. When the injury is
not physical, however, the determination is not so simple, particu-
larly because of the paucity of cases that grapple with the problem
of non-physical injury. Those courts that have confronted the prob-
lem have distinguished primary and secondary injuries in order to
test the adequacy of minimum contacts. The distinction has figured
prominently when a long-arm statute has been used to assert juris-
diction over a nonresident who has caused tortious injury of a com-
105. 12A MILGRIM, supra note 86, § 7.03[2](b), at 7-23 (footnotes omitted).
106. CAL. CIv. CODE § 410.10 (Deering 1971).
107. 326 U.S. 310 (1945).
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mercial rather than a physical nature. Jurisdiction is possible only
if the state is the situs of primary injury. The tortious event and its
immediate consequences must occur in the state. An allegation of
nothing more than secondary or consequential injury is inadequate
as a basis of jurisdiction. If the California plaintiff in the hypotheti-
cal case can show that the Japanese defendant's commercial tort
has caused primary injury in California, the defendant will be sub-
ject to jurisdiction on the basis of doing an act in the state. When,
as is generally the case, a tort can be said to occur where the injury
is suffered," 8 the defendant or its agent need not meet any other
jurisdictional criterion, such as presence, doing business in the
state, or having an agent there for service of process. Courts have
recognized the validity of applying a long-arm statute to this mini-
mum contacts theory.
In Amba Marketing Systems, Inc. v. Jobar International,
Inc., 109 personal jurisdiction was based on the Arizona long-arm stat-
ute, which has been extended to constitutional limits.1 , Conse-
108. Gray v. Amer. Radiator & Standard Sanitary Corp., 22 Ill. 2d 432, 435, 176 N.E.2d
761, 762 (1961). Accord: Consolidated Laboratories, Inc. v. Shandon Scientific Co., 384 F.2d
797, 802 (7th Cir. 1967); Waltham Watch Co. v. Hallmark Jewelers, Inc., 336 F.Supp. 1010,
1011 (N.D.ll. 1971). Though the state where the tortious injury is suffered generally has
jurisdiction over the tort, jurisdiction is not invariably proper there. For factors that can
qualify the prevalent rule, see RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 145 (1971),
which states the general principle applicable to tortious wrongs. Of particular interest is
comment e, Important contacts in determining state of most significant relationship.
109. 551 F.2d 784 (9th Cir. 1977).
110. Id. at 788. The New York long-arm statute, N.Y. Civ. Prac. Law § 302, "does not
confer the full complement of personal jurisdiction constitutionally permitted," Galgay v.
Bulletin Company, Inc., 504 F.2d 1062, 1066 (2d Cir. 1974), as the California and Arizona
long-arm statutes do, but a New York case articulates the critical distinction upon which the
Amba Marketing court relies. In American Eutectic Welding Alloys Sales Co. v. Dytron
Alloys Corp., the plaintiffs alleged that their sales employees were induced to work for the
defendant and to use the plaintiffs' confidential customer information as a means of soliciting
business in two states other than New York. 439 F.2d 428 (2d Cir. 1971). As a basis of
jurisdiction, the plaintiffs used a provision of the New York long-arm statute that applies to
a nonresident who commits a tortious act causing injury to a person or to property in the state,
if the defendant expects or reasonably should expect such consequences and if he derives
substantial benefit from interstate or international commerce. The provision of the statute
that the plaintiffs asserted was N.Y. Civ. Prac. Law § 302(a) 3(ii), cited in American Eutectic
Welding Alloys Sales Co. v. Dytron Alloys Corp., 439 F.2d 428 (2d Cir. 1971). The court found
no basis for jurisdiction. To determine the situs of an injury resulting from an act of unfair
competition, so that jurisdiction would be fair, the most apt criterion is where the plaintiff
lost business, because this place would "normally be a forum reasonably foreseeable by a
tortfeasor and it would usually be the place where the critical events associated with the
dispute took place." Id. at 433. The court is quoting Spectacular Promotions, Inc. v. Radio
Station WING, 272 F. Supp. 734, 737 (E.D.N.Y. 1967). The above noted criterion is also
decisive in a denial of long-arm jurisdiction as noted by the court in Chemical Bank v. World
Hockey Association, 403 F. Supp. 1374, 1379 (S.D.N.Y. 1975). The American Eutectics court
implicitly adopted the proposition set forth in Black v. Oberle Rentals, Inc., 55 Misc. 2d 398,
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quently, the statute permitted jurisdiction over a corporation that
had caused a commercial tort in the state. The court distinguished
primary from secondary effects of such a tort.
[T]he actual damage-causing event must have occurred in Ari-
zona, not merely the effect of the event. [Citation.] Thus, the
mere fact that Amba [the plaintiff] may have suffered injury to
its good will or reputation, dilution of the value of its trademark,
and damages from expected profits lost as a result of Jobar or the
California mail order houses' sale of the cheaper imitations in
states other than Arizona seemingly would not suffice to invoke
personal jurisdiction in Arizona."'
In a note to this passage, the court said that the resultant harm need
not be physical or personal but may be economic, as long as the
injury occurs in the state of the forum." 2 The decisive factor in cases
of this type is not whether the harm suffered was physical as op-
posed to commercial, but whether the primary injury-that is,
whether the tort itself-occurred in the state as opposed to whether
the plaintiff felt only the secondary effects there. Though the court
did not want to emphasize the commercial nature of this tort, the
distinction between primary and secondary injuries would be much
less likely to arise if the tortious injury were physical.
The Ninth Circuit in Amba Marketing used an analytical
framework to determine whether the minimum contacts alleged
meet the additional due process requirements of fair play and sub-
stantial justice."'
Although under this flexible standard a case-by-case determina-
tion necessarily must be made, this court has adopted a 3-step
analysis in making such determinations. First, the nonresident
defendant must do some act or consummate some transaction
within the forum, however indirect it may be. Second, the claim
must be one which arises out of, or results from, the defendant's
activities within the forum, even if the actual claim comes to frui-
285 N.Y.S.2d 226 (1967), that New York's long-arm statute did not apply to remote or
consequential injuries felt in New York simply because the plaintiff happened to be domiciled
there when the injury occurred elsewhere. The American Eutectics court quoted from Oberle
Rentals that:
To hold otherwise would open a veritable Pandora's Box of litigation subjecting
every conceivable prospective defendant involved in an accident with a New York
domiciliary to defend actions brought against them in the State of New York. This
is hardly the minimal contact with the State prerequisite to the exercise of its power
over a prospective defendant. [Id. at 434.]
111. Amba Marketing Sys., Inc. v. Jobar Int'l, Inc. 551 F.2d 784, 788 (9th Cir. 1977).
112. Id. at 788 n. 4.
113. Id. at 789.
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tion in another state. Finally, the overall reasonableness of subject-
ing the defendant to the jurisdiction of the forum's court must be
considered."'
In locating the situs of the injury, the court has proceeded through
the first two steps. To assess reasonableness, the third step, it ap-
plied standards analogous to those for forum non conveniens.,
Other long-arm cases based on the in-state tort theory have
given greater weight to the intentional' or reasonably foreseeable1 7
nature of the defendant's act. Both considerations figure as reasons
for jurisdiction in Centronics Data Computer Corporation v.
Mannesmann,"' a case that deserves attention because of its paral-
lels with the hypothetical contest between the California plaintiff
and the Japanese defendant.
Centronics, a Delaware corporation whose principal place of
doing business was in New Hampshire, sued Mannesmann, a mul-
tinational corporation headquartered in Germany. The complaint
alleged violation of antitrust laws, interference with advantageous
contractual relations, misappropriation of trade secrets, and defa-
mation. Jurisdiction was bottomed on the federal diversity of citi-
zenship statute,"' on Congress's granting district courts original ju-
risdiction in civil cases arising under federal legislation on com-
merce and antitrust matters, 20 and on two antitrust statutes that
authorize district court jurisdiction.' The complaint did not spec-
ify the New Hampshire statute on which jurisdiction rested, but the
court concluded that the allegations implied use of New Hamp-
shire's long-arm statutes. 2 Venue was approved on two grounds.
Federal law provides that "[a]n alien may be sued in any dis-
trict"'' 3 and permits suit in the district "in which the claim
arose."4 The complaint stated that the plaintiff suffered injury in
New Hampshire. In moving for dismissal of the complaint, the de-
114. Id. The same criteria are stated in William W. Bond, Jr. & Associates, Inc. v.
Montego Bay Development Corp., 405 F. Supp. 256 (W.D. Tenn. 1975), cited in 2 MooRE's
FEDERAL PRACTICE 4.41-1[3], at 4-479 (2d ed. 1978).
115. Amba Marketing, supra note 111, at 789-90.
116. Bradley v. Cheleuitte, 65 F.R.D. 57 (D. Mass. 1974), cited in 2 MOORE'S FEDERAL
PRACTICE, supra note 114, at 4-477.
117. Walker v. University Books, Inc., 382 F. Supp. 126 (N.D. Cal. 1974), cited in 2
MOORE's FEDERAL PRACTICE, supra note 114, at 4-478.
118. 432 F. Supp. 659 (D.N.H. 1977).
119. 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a) (1977).
120. Id. § 1337.
121. 15 U.S.C. §§ 15,26 (1977).
122. N.H. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 300:11(c) (1948) and § 300:14 (1971).
123. 28 U.S.C. § 1391(d) (1977).
124. Id. § 1391(b).
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fendant claimed its contacts with the district provided insufficient
grounds for personal jurisdiction. Mannesmann also argued that
venue requirements of the antitrust statutes were not met and that
service of process under the New Hampshire long-arm statute 1 5 was
unauthorized. The defendant further argued that venue was impro-
per because New Hampshire was an inconvenient forum.
The court rejected all these arguments. It asserted jurisdiction
on the statutory bases the plaintiff alleged or implied, and it ac-
cepted the plaintiff's commercial tort theory. The opinion under-
scored the foreseeable character of the defendant's actions as a fac-
tor establishing grounds for jurisdiction, it found that the right to
redress at home outweighs the inconvenience of defending, and it
approved a due process argument for minimum contacts with the
nation rather than the state. Each of these points deserves consider-
ation.
The court noted the trend in many states to expand long-arm
statutes. Among acceptable minimum contacts is doing an act
within the state. Committing a tort is one such act."' The court
cited a New Hampshire statute that equates a foreign corporation's
commission of a tort in the state with doing business there.12 Com-
mitting a tort is regarded as implied agreement that process may
be served on the secretary of state with the same legal effect as if
served on the corporation at its principal place of business and in
accordance with the law of the state or country concerned.
Substantive as well as procedural reasons support jurisdiction.
The court relied on McGee v. International Life Insurance Co., ' in
which the defendant, like Mannesmann, was not complying with
the "doing business" standard. McGee found that the International
Shoe fair play test was satisfied because California had a manifest
interest in affording a remedy for a resident who would have been
at a severe disadvantage if forced to sue the defendant insurer in a
distant state. The Centronics court observed that McGee
can be distinguished on the grounds that it involved a contract, not
a tort as is involved here, but the Court's reasoning applies with
equal vigor to the alleged tort in this case. New Hampshire's inter-
est in protecting its corporate employers from the predatory ac-
tions of an alien corporation is at least equal to California's interest
125. N.H. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 300:11 (1949).
126. Centronics Data Computer Corp. v. Mannesmann, 432 F. Supp. 659, 664-65
(D.N.H. 1977).
127. N.H. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 300:14, cited in Centronics Data Computer Corp. v. Man-
nesmann, 432 F. Supp. 659, 665 n.2 (D.N.H. 1977).
128. 355 U.S. 220 (1957).
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in protecting its residents insured by a Texas company. Centronics
would be far more inconvenienced if it were forced to sue in Ger-
many, where it is not clear that an action would lie at all, than the
California insured would be by a trip to Texas.'1
In addition to arguing by analogy, the court supported its decision
with cases in which an intentional tort served as a basis for long-
arm jurisdiction. One such pertinent case is Maricopa County v.
American Petrofina, Inc.,'30 in which an Arizona corporation alleged
injury from a California resident's price-fixing conspiracy. Even
though the defendant had not visited the state, had no residence
there, and did no business there directly or indirectly, the court
upheld Arizona jurisdiction.
Had the alleged conspiracy been formed while the parties were
gathered in Arizona, the effects of it would be no different from
those generated by conspiracy agreed upon in London. A conspir-
acy, no matter where made, creates a destructive force which ex-
tends into the state.1 3'
Centronics alleged that Mannesmann's conspiracy interfered
with its business in New Hampshire. It argued that the defendants
must have known that injury would occur in the state and that the
defendant "reasonably should have expected to be sued in the State
of New Hampshire."'' 2 The court agreed. The situation resembled
a products liability action in which a defective product manufac-
tured outside New Hampshire injured a state resident. '
Regardless of whether injury is intentional or negligent, the
Restatement (Second) of Conflict of Laws supports jurisdiction
when a foreign corporation or an individual does an act elsewhere
and causes effects in a state, unless jurisdiction is unreasonable
because of the nature of the corporation's relationship to the state.,:4
Comment a to section 37 of the Restatement indicates that inten-
tionally causing effects in the state authorizes jurisdiction over an
agent or principal not present in the state at the time the effects
occurred as long as the state could have exercised jurisdiction had
the defendant been present when the harm was done. "So one who
129. Centronics Data Computer Corp. v. Mannesmann, 432 F. Supp. 659, 665 (D.N.H.
1977).
130. 322 F. Supp. 467 (N.D. Cal. 1971).
131. Id. at 469.
132. Centronics Data Computer Corp. v. Mannesmann, 432 F. Supp. 659, 666-67
(D.N.H. 1977).
133. Id. at 667. See Look v. Hughes Tool Co., 367 F. Supp. 1003 (D.N.H. 1973).
134. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) CONFLICr OF LAws, see § 37, comment a at 156-59 (1971) (on
individuals); see § 50 at 178-79 (1971) (on foreign corporations).
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intentionally shoots a bullet into a state is as subject to the judicial
jurisdiction of the state as to causes of action arising from effects of
the shot as if he had actually fired the bullet in the state."'3 The
court concluded that Mannesmann was within its reach. "The tra-
ditional notions of justice and fair play should not be used to extend
a cloak of immunity over deliberate torts merely because the defen-
dant is an alien corporation. To do so would be to deny justice and
fair play to the plaintiff. '13
One of the court's major arguments not yet examined is that
jurisdiction can be based on national minimum contacts. The court
observed that Mannesmann's state contacts furnished insufficient
grounds for jurisdiction, but it agreed with the plaintiff's contention
that "since defendants are alien, it is not their contacts with the
State that should control, but . . . their contacts with the country
as a whole must be considered."'' 7 The plaintiff offered two reasons
for its position. First, corporations headquartered in foreign lands
are no more inconvenienced by travelling to one state rather than
another. The court said that this generalization will not always be
valid, but it acknowledged that the statement applies to these
facts.'3 The plaintiff's second and more persuasive argument was
that a foreign corporation might have very substantial national con-
tacts but insufficient state contacts to ever justify state jurisdiction.
Those injured by the corporation's serious torts or contract breaches
might never have a forum in which to seek redress. The court admit-
ted that this proposition is not widely accepted and that there is no
statutory authority for it.
But in this age of multinational conglomerates' doing business
on an international scale, plaintiffs position has merit, and I spe-
135. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 37, comment a, at 156-57 (1971).
136. Centronics Data Computer Corp. v. Mannesmann, 432 F. Supp. 659, 668 (D.N.H.
1977).
137. Id. at 663. At this page the court cites several cases in which the national versus
local minimum contacts theory has been argued. The court also cites several cases in which
the national contacts theory has been sustained as a valid basis of jurisdiction. Cyromedics,
Inc. v. Spembly, Ltd., 397 F. Supp. 287 (D. Conn. 1975); Holt v. Klosters Rederi ALS, 355
F. Supp. 354 (W.D. Mich. 1973); Alco Standard Corp. v. Benalal, 345 F. Supp. 14, 24-25 (E.D.
Pa. 1972). The national theory has in addition gained some ground in patent law. "Recent
decisions evidence the emergence of a special due process standard in federal question cases
brought against foreign defendants. Under this standard the federal International Shoe test
of minimum contacts is applicable, but the touchstone becomes minimum contacts of the
defendant with the entire United States rather than with the forum state [citation]. While
this standard has been invoked in other types of federal questions cases [citation], it has
received perhaps its strongest support in decisions involving foreign patent infringers."
Neagly, In Personam Jurisdiction over Foreign Inducers of Infringement, 58 J. PAT. OFF. Soc'Y
712, 718-19 (1976).
138. Centronics, supra note 126 at 663-64.
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cifically rule that where an alien defendant is sued by an American
plaintiff, and where there is no particular inconvenience due to the
specific forum state, the fact that the defendant is an alien and
that there is no other forum in which to litigate the claim should
be taken into consideration for purposes of determining whether a
finding of jurisdiction meets the requisite constitutional standards
of fair play. 39
About three months before the Centronics opinion was handed
down, the Ninth Circuit declined-rather guardedly-to endorse a
plaintiff's argument for aggregating an alien defendant's contacts
with the United States.40 If a Nevada district court had accepted
the aggregation theory, the plaintiff would have been able to settle
in Nevada two claims arising from substantial loans made in Cali-
fornia. The appellate court disapproved the theory basically be-
cause it is not authorized-by statute, either on the state or federal
levels. Nevada's long-arm statute is not as broad as due process
permits it to be, and the Federal Rules do not allow action on the
theory.' The court did agree, nonetheless, that aggregation may be
proper under particular federal statutes that provide for worldwide
service of process. More significantly, the court intimated that if
general procedural statutes were amended to authorize aggregation,
"[I]t might very well be neither unfair nor unreasonable as a mat-
ter of due process to aggregate the nonforum contacts of an alien
with his forum contacts or to require an alien to litigate in one state
both those causes of action which originate in that forum state and
139. Id., at 664. Similar reasoning appears in First Flight Co. v. National Carloading
Corp., 209 F. Supp. 730 (E.D. Tenn. 1962). The court ruled that personal jurisdiction in
federal courts is governed by federal and not state law. Actually this jurisdictional theory is
as old as Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S. 714 (1877). Ultimately both cases say that a sovereignty
has personal jurisdiction over any defendant present within its territorial limits. Thus, ac-
cording to First Flight Company, a federal court should be able to exercise personal jurisidic-
tion over any defendant present within the United States, regardless of the defendant's
minimum contacts with the state in which the district court sits. Although Fourteenth
Amendment restrictions applicable to the states have been imposed on federal courts,
"[Tihe anomaly here lies not only in overlooking the principle that the United States may
exercise personal jurisdiction over any defendant within the United States, but also in limit-
ing federal action by a constitutional provision applicable only to state action." First Flight
Co., supra this note, at 737. The opinion draws heavily upon an article by Professor Thomas
F. Green, Jr., Federal Jurisdiction In Personam of Corporations and Due Process, 14 VAND.
L. Rav. 967 (1961). Green proposes that the Fifth Amendment due process clause applies to
federal action as the Fourteenth applies to the states. He would analogize Supreme Court
tests for state jurisdiction governed by the Fourteenth Amendment to federal jurisdiction
under the Fifth Amendment. His conclusion is that the United States may exercise personal
jurisdiction over a corporation if it has minimum contacts with the United States and if such
jurisdiction does not offend traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice.
140. Wells Fargo & Co. v. Wells Fargo Exp. Co., 556 F.2d 406 (9th Cir. 1977).
141. Id. at 416-18.
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those arising elsewhere in the United States." (Emphasis added). 42
On the whole, Centronics v. Mannesmann offers an authorita-
tive paradigm for the hypothetical problem posed in this note. In
the Centronics case, the plaintiff alleged a commercial tort, which
included trade secrets misappropriation, and obtained jurisdiction
over the alien defendant by virtue of federal laws and a state long-
arm statute. Antitrust considerations are irrelevant to the hypothet-
ical, and did not receive much comment in the opinion, but other-
wise the federal jurisdictional statutes' might be employed in a
district court. The reasoning on due process is helpful in putting
McGee's convenience scales in an international situation and in
emphasizing foreseeability of tortious injury as a significant factor
in determining the fairness of jurisdiction. While the court regarded
its appealing and somewhat unconventional theory on nationwide
minimum contacts as essential to jurisdiction over Mannesmann,
the theory is weak in that no federal statute authorizes it. Moreover,
it seems to lose sight of the fact that an in-state tort itself, ade-
quately pleaded, can be a sufficient minimum contact for personal
jurisdiction. In any event, the two principal arguments for national
minimum contacts would work just as well in support of a jurisdic-
tional argument based on doing an act in the state.
Notice is fundamental to due process. Once a court has ac-
quired jurisdiction over an alien defendant, notice does not often
pose unusual problems. California permits service of summons by
mail, provided that the addressee makes written acknowledge-
ment.' Such service may be made outside the United States' if
service is reasonably calculated to give notice as required by the law
of the foreign authority or by its directions in response to a letter
rogatory.14 Normally these state notice provisions are adequate, but
if they should conflict with the law of the defendant's country, alter-
native authority for notice may exist if the defendant's nation is a
party to a multilateral international convention regulating service
abroad of judicial and extrajudicial documents,147 a treaty to which
142. Id. at 416. (Emphasis supplied). If a tortfeasor's act causes primary injuries in more
than one state, the injured party will have to bring suit in each state in which he has been
injured, absent a provision for claim aggregation, such as that applicable to multistate defa-
mation in Restatement (Second) of Conflict of Laws § 150, comment c (1971).
143. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1332(a), 1391(b)(d) (1948).
144. CAL. CODE CIv. PROC. § 415.30 (Deering 1973).
145. Id. § 415.40.
146. Id. § 413.10.
147. 20 U.S.T. 361-67, T.I.A.S. No. 6638. Four federal cases make reference to this
treaty: Martin Motor Sales, Inc. v. Saab-Scandia A.B., 397 F. Supp. 389 (S.D.N.Y. 1974);
Hicks v. Kawasaki Heavy Indus., 452 F. Supp. 130 (M.D. Pa. 1978); Tamari v. Bache & Co.
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the United States and Japan are parties. The agreement became
effective in the United States on February 10, 1969 and in Japan
about a year later. Article 1 of the convention says that the accord
"shall apply in all cases, in civil or commercial matters, where there
is occasion to transmit a judicial or extrajudicial document for serv-
ice abroad" to a person whose address is known.'48 Japan did not
endorse provisions that would have required certain of its officials
to transmit documents related to litigation initiated either by a
foreign authority or by one of the foreign government's citizens. But
Japan has endorsed a provision that permits documents to be sent
directly to a Japanese party.
In Shoei Kako Co., Ltd. v. Superior Court, San Francisco, a
California plaintiff mailed a summons and complaint directly to a
Japanese defendant, whose signed receipt proved actual delivery.
The court agreed with the plaintiff's argument that the treaty au-
thorized such notice, which justified the court's exercising jurisdic-
tion. As long as the law of the state addressed does not conflict with
the practice, a document "may always be served by delivery to an
addressee who accepts it voluntarily." '49 Here the defendant's return
receipt indicated a voluntary acceptance. 5 ' The court concluded
that
the provisions of the convention do not prevent the exercise of
jurisdiction of the courts of this state in actions where the court
has jurisdiction over a party arising from the nature of the claim
asserted and notice has been given by service by mail accompanied
by a receipt for delivery. It is recognized that this court cannot
render an interpretation of the treaty that will bind the courts of
Japan in the event plaintiff, if he obtains a judgment against peti-
tioner, seeks to enforce it through the courts in that nation.' 5'
Before considering the effectiveness of such a judgment, there is one
other problem regarding notice. That problem is language.
Hunt v. Mobil Oil Corporation was an action brought by an
independent oil producer against the world's seven largest oil produ-
cers and three other independents for breaching an agreement be-
tween the parties and for antitrust violations.' 5 Among the defen-
(Lebanon), 431 F. Supp. 1226 (N.D. Ill. 1977); and Juana Albandoz de Reyes v. Japan Air
Lines, 70 F.R.D. 64 (D.P.R. 1975).
148. 20 U.S.T. 361, 362, T.I.A.S. No. 6638.
149. 33 Cal. App. 3d 808, 821, 109 Cal. Rptr. 402 (1973). The court is quoting Article 5
of the treaty cited supra note 148, at 362.
150. 33 Cal. App. 3d 808, 821, 109 Cal. Rptr. 402 (1973).
151. Id. at 822, 109 Cal. Rptr. at 412.
152. 410 F. Supp. 4 (S.D.N.Y. 1975).
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dants was a German corporation, Gelsenberg Aktiengesellschaft.
Gelsenberg moved to dismiss the complaint, one of its reasons being
that jurisdiction was invalid because the papers for service of pro-
cess were in English. The Hunt court deemed the argument worth
little attention, since the defendant "is a multi-national corpora-
tion; its representatives negotiated the contract in this district in
the English language and executed the basic as well as the supple-
mentary agreements in English.""1 3 The Shoei Kako defendant
raised the same objection, buttressing its position with Julen v.
Larson.'4 In that case, a Swiss consul had forwarded German docu-
ments that he failed to describe in English to a California defendant
who had apparently been doing business in Switzerland. The court
held that the defendant did not receive sufficient notice to justify
his being subject to a Swiss court's default judgment. When the
Shoei Kako defendant compared himself to the Julen defendant,
the court found the comparison unconvincing. Japanese companies
engaged in international trade typically send and receive communi-
cations in English. Here, the Japanese company executed the Eng-
lish language postal receipt for the summons, and the corporation
had apparently authorized English-language sales brochures for dis-
tribution in California. "The special appearance in these proceed-
ings bespeaks that the purport of the documents was understood."' 5
The California plaintiff in our hypothetical can easily notify the
Japanese defendant by mail. In the unlikely event that California
statutes on mailed notice conflict with Japanese law, the plaintiff
can be sure that the international treaty will provide him with a
dependable method of giving notice. One can safely assume that any
Japanese corporation that would want to acquire the California
firm's computer technology trade secrets would be sufficiently large
and sophisticated to conduct a significant part of its business in
English. Thus, notice in English should not be objectionable.
The final question here is whether obtaining jurisdiction over
the Japanese tortfeasor is worth the trouble. Will jurisdiction result
in an enforceable judgment?
If the hypothetical California plaintiff has any chances of ob-
taining legal relief, those chances are better in California than in
Japan. The Japanese have an ingrained aversion to litigation. They
see it as emphasizing conflict between disputants who are unable
to resolve their differences. The price for this disagreeable endeavor
can be the shame of bearing a moral fault.
153. Id. at 9.
154. 25 Cal. App. 3d 325, 101 Cal. Rptr. 796 (1972).
155. Shoei Kako v. Superior Court, 33 Cal. App. 3d 808, 824, 109 Cal. Rptr. 412.
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The more favored option for dispute resolution would be a compro-
mise solution or other informal means. Both informal conciliation
and mediation perpetuate social and even economic relationships.
This is a participatory dispute resolution which calls for the mu-
tual reconciliation of differences.
Therefore, a wide discrepancy exists between promulgated
law, which has been greatly influenced by European and Anglo-
American law, on the upper (or formal) level, and the actual be-
havior fostered by Tokugawa justice, on the lower (or informal)
level.' 6
Conciliation is likely to be a subtle process for which the foreigner
will not be eligible, for by definition he is a gaijin or outsider.
Even if an American who brings suit in a Japanese court can
be assured of impartial treatment,5 7 the deficiency of Japanese
trade secrets law is disturbing. In Nisshin Sangyo K.K. v. Masuo
Kawakami (1955), 111 the court recognized no right in a method that
was patentable but which had not been patented. A right would
arise only upon publication of the patent application.
This decision lends support to the view that for civil law purposes,
that is, insofar as the provisions of the Civil Code governing prop-
erty and property rights are concerned, trade secrets and secret
know-how, whether or not patentable, are not property or rights. 15 9
About ten years later the Tokyo High Court reached a similar con-
clusion in Deutsche Werft Aktiengesellschaft v. Chuetsu Waukesha
Yugen Kaisha (1966). The Court wrote:
156. Johnson, The Japanese Legal Milieu and Its Relationship to Business, 13 AM. Bus.
L.J. 335, 338-39 (1976). Two other writers make similar observations that are illustrative of
the appreciable body of comment on the Japanese dislike of litigation.
There is a deep-rooted disinclination to settle disputes by resort to litigation.
Reconcilement and conciliation are the prevailing methods of settling legal disputes
in Japan. By reconcilement is meant the extrajudicial settlement by the parties
themselves; conciliation refers essentially to reconcilement brought about by the
good offices of a third party. A. WISE, 1 TRADE SECRETS AND KNow-How THROUGHOUT
TE WORLD, § 1.01[6], at 1-14 (1976) [hereinafter cited as WIsE].
In Japan a person who asserts rigid legal rights is thought to be "inflexible"
and selfish. The businessman never introduces a lawyer into a domestic business
conference. Introduction of a lawyer into a business conference is thought to be an
unfriendly act, an act equal to an explicit threat of litigation .... The law, which
purports to sort out human relations on supposedly objective bases, goes directly
contrary to the Japanese feeling that relations (even business relations) should be
based upon a warm and subjective relationship which can solve every practical
problem by mutual compromise and accommodation, regardless of formal legal
rights and obligations. Stevens, Japanese Legal System and Traditions, in CURRENT
LEGAL ASPECTS OF DOING BUSINESS IN THE FAR EAST 13-14 (R.C. Allison ed. 1972).
157. See Stevens, supra note 156 at 10.
158. WIsE, supra note 156, § 1.03[8], at 1-40 to 1-41.
159. Id. at 1-41.
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Although know-how has property value, it cannot be said that at
the present time the law recognizes that it has the status of a right
(whether an intangible right or a right of obligation) which is en-
forceable against a third party. Protection of know-how can only
be achieved by the efforts of the owner to maintain it as an in-
dustrial secret and prevent disclosure to others. 60
By bringing suit in the United States, the California plaintiff will
not only only have the advantage of being familar with procedure,
but he will also be assured of having a well developed body of trade
secrets law at hand. 6'
In Hunt v. Mobil Oil Corporation a German defendant con-
tended that the court should not entertain a case against it because
German courts would not enforce a judgment for the plaintiff. The
court was not deterred:
Whether or not West Germany will recognize and give full faith
and credit to a judgment of this court is a matter for it to decide
if and when plaintiff may seek to enforce in West Germany any
judgment which may be rendered in its favor. It may well be that
should plaintiff prevail, it may not necessarily be compelled to
effectuate the judgment in West Germany. There may be assets
here available to be applied in satisfaction of the judgment. 62
If the California plaintiff suing the Japanese defendant wins a judg-
ment in our hypothetical case, its enforcement will depend on where
he has brought suit. If he has won in a federal court, he may by
registering a final judgment for money or property have the judg-
ment enforced by any district court. 6 ' Federal Rule of Civil Proce-
dure 64 authorizes a federal court to use property seizure remedies
of the state in which it is sitting, as long as the state remedy does
not conflict with federal law. If the plaintiff has won in a California
court, the judgment may be executed anywhere in the state. If the
defendant does not have property that can satisfy the judgment in
California but does have such property in another state, the plaintiff
has two choices. He can follow the traditional procedure of bringing
160. Decision of Sept. 5, 1966, 17 Kayu Minshu 769, 474 Hanrei Jiho 86 (1967), cited in
WisE, supra note 156, § 1.03[8], at 1-40.
161. "Trade secret law and patent law have co-existed in this country for over one
hundred years. Each has its particular role to play, and the operation of one does not take
away from the need for the other." Kewanee Oil Co. v. Bicron Corp., 416 U.S. 470, 493 (1974).
162. Hunt v. Mobil Oil Corp., 410 F. Supp. 4, 10 (S.D. N.Y. 1975).
163. "A judgment in an action for the recovery of money or property now or hereafter
entered in any district court which has become final by appeal or expiration of time for appeal
may be registered in any other district by filing therein a certified copy of such judgment. A
judgment so registered shall have the same effect as a judgment of the district court of the
district where registered and may be enforced in like manner." 28 U.S.C. § 1963 (1977).
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suit and winning a judgment in the other state in order to reach the
defendant's property there. An easier alternative is simply register-
ing the California judgment if the other state has enacted a version
of the Uniform Enforcement of Foreign Judgments Act.'64
Because Shaffer v. Heitner abrogated quasi in rem jurisdiction
as an insular jurisdictional category, a determination that an at-
taching court lacks in personam jurisdiction might appear to elimi-
nate altogether any basis of jurisdiction.6 15 According to the Shaffer
court, "[t]he standard for determining whether an exercise of juris-
diction over the interests of persons is consistent with the Due Pro-
cess Clause is the minimum contacts standard elucidated in
International Shoe. "I The Shaffer opinion did, however, qualify
this standard. If a defendant has minimum contacts with a state in
which he has little or no property, a plaintiff seeking a judgment
against him can attach property the defendant owns in another
state where minimum contacts do not exist:
[A] State in which property is located should have jurisdiction to
attach that property, by use of proper procedures, as security for
a judgment being sought in a forum where litigation can be main-
tained consistently with International Shoe. [Citation.] More-
over, we now of nothing to justify the assumption that a debtor can
avoid paying his obligations by removing his property to a State
in which his creditor cannot obtain personal jurisdiction over him.
The Full Faith and Credit Clause, after all, makes the valid in
personam judgment of one State enforceable in all other States.
[footnotes omitted]."7
Carolina Power & Light Co. v. Uranex applied this Shaffer
logic. In that case a North Carolina buyer sued a French seller for
breach of a uranium sales contract. While arbitration of the dispute
was pending in New York, the buyer attached a debt that the seller
owed a California corporation. The California district court would
164. The Uniform Enforcement of Foreign Judgments Act (1964 Revised Act) has been
adopted by Alaska, Arizona, Colorado, Connecticut, Idaho, Kansas, Maine, New York, North
Dakota, Oklahoma, Pennsylvania, South Dakota, Tennessee, Washington, Wisconsin, and
Wyoming. 13 UNIFORM LAWS ANNOTATED 171 (1975). The Uniform Enforcement of Foreign
Judgments Act (1948 Act) has been adopted by Arkansas, Illinois, Missouri, Nebraska, Ore-
gon and Washington. 13 UNIFORM LAWS ANNOTATED 181 (1975). California has made limited
use of the 1964 version of the Uniform Act to fashion statutes for the enforcement of sister-
state judgments that require the payment of money. CAL. CODE CwV. PROC. § 1710.10(c). See
Feldman, The Sister State and Foreign Money-Judgments Act of 1974, 50 CAL. ST. BAR J.
483 (1975).
165. This sentence paraphrases Carolina Power & Light Co. v. Uranex, 451 F. Supp.
1044, 1047 (N.D. Cal. 1977).
166. 433 U.S. 186, 207 (1977).
167. Id. at 210.
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not exercise in personam jurisdiction to decide the merits of the case
because of the inadequacy of the French corporation's contacts with
the forum. The court nevertheless did decide that the Shaffer
court's notions of fair play and substantial justice allowed limited
prejudgment jurisdiction for attachment of the debt. The presence
of the defendant's property in California was not fortuitous, and the
California forum was not an inconvenient place for the defendant
to contest the limited issues arising from the attachment. The most
compelling reason for allowing attachment was that without it the
court would have been powerless to secure a sum that would ade-
quately compensate the plaintiff if it won. The French corporation
had no other United States assets that would satisfy a judgment,
and denial of attachment jurisdiction would have risked giving a
winning plaintiff only a Pyrrhic victory.6 8
A third possibility is that a federal or state judgment could be
enforced in a third country. For instance, Canada could consent to
honor such an American judgment.'
This note has suggested that a California computer electronics
manufacturer can protect its trade secrets from foreign (e.g., Japa-
nese) industrial espionage by two effective means. It can success-
fully proceed on a breach of contract theory against a former em-
ployee who has violated a precisely drawn nondisclosure agreement.
If an alien competitor has induced the violation, substantive liabil-
ity may exist. A California manufacturer that can show it has suf-
fered primary injury from a Japanese defendant's commercial tort
can use the state's long-arm statute to acquire jurisdiction over the
defendant. Computer technology trade secrets can be tremendously
valuable. Even if an alien's only contact with Califonia is a misap-
propriation scheme that tortiously harms a state corporation, that
alien should-and can-come within the grasp of the law.
168. Carolina Power & Light Co., supra note 166 at 1048.
169. A New York case decided since the body of this note was written deals with a
problem quite similar to that posed here. A New York corporation sought an injunction to
prevent a former employee from working for a competitor and to prohibit the employee from
divulging alleged trade secrets. Though the competitor was an out-of-state corporation, it was
subject to personal jurisdiction because the New York long-arm statute could extend to
nondomiciliary defendants whose tortious acts outside the state caused injury within it. By
creating a strong inference of a conscious plan to unfairly compete and to misappropriate
trade secrets, the allegations justified anticipatory injunctive relief. The court admitted that
legislative history did not refer to commercial torts as a motive for the long-arm statute, but
it did not read the omission as meaning that the statute had to be restricted to noncommercial
torts. The court found that the nonresident could reasonably have forseen that its actions
would cause tortious injury in the forum. Showing the reasonableness of such foreseeability
satisfied the constitutional requirement for applying the long-arm statute to a nonresident.
Sybron Corp. v. Wetzel, 47 U.S.L.W. 2405 (N.Y. Ct. App. 12/7/78).
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